

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Elite and popular basis for legitimacy of democracy in Zambia since 1991

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ABSTRACT

With three peaceful transfers of power since the early 1990s and a well-established commitment to electoral politics among the country's elite, Zambia is often held up as a model of democracy in Africa. What has not been carefully examined are its experiential sources of legitimacy of democracy. This article identifies five factors that explain it: competitive elections alongside a depoliticised military; vibrant political parties able to mobilise support, participate in elections, and occasionally win power; a robust civil society capable of checking the power of the government and forcing presidents to compromise; effective independent media outlets that serve as crucial platforms for accountability; and a liberal constitution that protects democratic rights. The article provides an analysis of these determining sources – which are used here as an analytical tool rather than a model establishing causation – by showing how they have played out in practice between 1991 and 2021.

RÉSUMÉ

Avec trois transferts de pouvoir pacifiques depuis le début des années 1990 et un engagement bien établi en faveur de la politique électorale au sein de l'élite du pays, la Zambie est souvent considérée comme un modèle de démocratie en Afrique. Ce qui n'a pas été soigneusement examiné, ce sont les sources expérientielles de la légitimité de la démocratie. Cet article identifie cinq facteurs qui l'expliquent : des élections compétitives aux côtés d'une armée dépolitisée ; des partis politiques dynamiques, capables de mobiliser des soutiens, de participer aux élections et parfois, de conquérir le pouvoir ; une société civile robuste capable de contrôler le pouvoir du gouvernement et de forcer les présidents à faire des compromis ; des médias indépendants efficaces qui servent de plateformes cruciales pour la responsabilisation ; et une constitution libérale qui protège les droits démocratiques. L'article propose une analyse de ces sources déterminantes – qui sont employées ici comme un outil analytique plutôt que comme un modèle établissant une causalité – en montrant comment elles ont joué dans la pratique entre 1991 et 2021.

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Introduction

A puzzling feature of Zambia's democracy in the 2010s was the disjuncture between popular perceptions of this type of political system and academic interpretations of the subject. A recent study decried the erosion of democratic norms over the preceding decade (2011–2021) even when successive Afrobarometer surveys continued to show higher levels of public trust in the democratic system itself over the same period. "The election of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND [United Party for National Development] by a wide margin on August 12, 2021," the study argued, "ended this episode of backsliding by the [Edgar] Lungu presidency" (Hinfelaar et al. 2023, 189). Over two decades earlier, Bratton and Posner (1999) had raised similar concerns about democratic backsliding in Zambia under President Fredrick Chiluba. They warned about the potential for declining public support in the democratic system following a series of regime actions that undercut democratic norms. This included the manipulation of democratic institutions by the incumbent regime that substantially undercut contestation and participatory rights, such as the exclusion of former president Kenneth Kaunda from contesting the 1996 election. In the intervening period, the anticipated "crisis of representative democracy" never occurred. Indeed, as revealed by the nine survey rounds of Afrobarometer data from 1999 to 2022, the majority of both elite and ordinary Zambians repeatedly expressed support for democracy relative to other forms of government. Why do Zambians continue to perceive democracy as the most legitimate political system for the country? What are the sources of that perception? This article explores these questions. More broadly, the article contributes to the literature on the state and political legitimacy by examining the experiential sources of legitimacy in relation to a democratic system.

As illustrated by the aforementioned two studies, much of the existing literature on democracy in Zambia has tended to focus on episodes of democratic backsliding. Neglected in these analyses are the factors that explain why democracy has enjoyed high levels of legitimacy among Zambians over a thirty-year period. In any case, the notion of democratic backsliding implies a certain teleology of forward progression and that anything else must count as backsliding. This has hardly been the case in Zambia. As the studies of Hinfelaar et al. and Bratton and Posner show, there was never a golden age of Zambian democracy when the ideal standard was achieved. In the circumstances, "backsliding" represents tendencies that have always been present in a democratic system, but which become more or less visible at particular junctures, depending on "the personality and quality of the leader and his chosen coalition" (Hinfelaar et al. 2023, 190). The puzzle is the continued elite and popular trust in the democratic system despite the factors that point towards its erosion. Investigating the sources of legitimacy for democracy, particularly in the context of Africa where the viability of multiparty systems generally remains a challenging prospect, may help us understand the conditions under which support for democracy is likely to endure or crumble over time.

If it is true that countries where the rules and norms of liberal democracy are seen as "the only game in town" have greater prospects for achieving political liberalisation, then Zambia represents an appropriate choice for a case study. With three peaceful transfers of power since the early 1990s and a well-established commitment to electoral politics among the country's elite, the country is often held by researchers as a model of

democracy in Africa (Joseph 1992). What has not been carefully examined are the experiential sources of legitimacy of democracy. This article identifies five institutional elements to explain it. The first is a track record of elections with consequences that result in alternation and peaceful transfer of power, which in turn feeds popular belief in the power of democracy to change governments. Attached to this element is the continued reluctance of the military to interfere in political processes, which increases the willingness by an incumbent president to concede defeat whenever it becomes clear that they have lost. The second is the unrestricted presence of political parties able to mobilise support, participate in elections, and sometimes wrest power from the party in government. The third is the existence of a robust civil society capable of checking the power of the government and forcing presidents to compromise. The fourth is the prevalence of independent media outlets – both print and broadcast – that serve as crucial platforms for civil society and the political opposition. Last is the existence of a liberal constitution that protects democratic rights, including those of the aforementioned institutions.

The article provides an analysis of these determining factors – which are used here as an analytical tool rather than a model establishing causation – by showing how they have played out in practice since 1991. Using interviews with politicians, members of civil society and journalists, I argue that the legitimacy of Zambia's democracy is based upon deep support for the idea among political and civic elites in formal institutions that democracy is the foundation for political competition. I further show that the country has remained a relatively stable multiparty democracy for over thirty years and is likely to continue to be one because there are strong incentives for elites in these institutions to support democracy as a basis for political life.

In other words, democratic legitimation is manifested in the form of support for democracy and democratic institutions as an intrinsic value or an end in itself. This predisposition is informed by the legacy of a long experience of authoritarian rule and an uncompetitive political environment under the one-party political dispensation. As a result, Zambians consider the multiparty democratic system acceptable because it guarantees the delivery of political goods, such as civil and political rights. More broadly, the behaviour and attitude of elites in key formal institutions is central to the legitimation of democratic systems in Africa, and their commitment to the norms and practices of liberal democracy tends to be higher in countries with a long history of one-party rule and where the military is less politicised because it did not emerge from a liberation army.

The paper is divided into four sections. Following this introduction, the next section provides the theoretical framing of the paper by unpacking the meaning of the concept of legitimacy as used in this article, starting with popular legitimacy (public belief in the system) and moving on to elite legitimacy (elites' belief in the system). The third section provides a context-embedded analysis of the experiential sources of democratic legitimacy in Zambia from 1991 to 2021. The last section is the conclusion.

What is legitimacy?

Following his loss to an opposition challenger in the 2021 election, Zambia's former president Edgar Lungu acknowledged that "What has sustained our democracy is the legitimacy that the political system continues to enjoy from citizens." In an interview, Lungu emphasised the importance of legitimacy in his willingness to concede defeat:

> I was inspired to concede defeat by Dr Kaunda who peacefully handed over power after losing the 1991 election. President Rupiah Banda simply consolidated that record, and he too inspired me to accept that there is life after the presidency. I was under pressure from my colleagues not to concede. They encouraged me to go to court and petition the results and there were very good grounds on which a petition could have been filed. In the end, I decided against going to court because I knew that even if I won the court case, I would lack legitimacy since I had lost the election.[1]

The former Zambian president did not concede that he ran an authoritarian regime nor explain what he understood *legitimacy* to mean. However, his reference to *legitimacy* shows that even aspirational autocrats are unwilling to govern without it. What is it? Legitimacy simply means the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or regime by a political community. An authority is viewed as legitimate when it has the right and justification to exercise power. In the context of democracy, legitimacy entails compliance with the political system by both elite actors and ordinary people, the consequence of which is the stability of that system. According to Locke, political legitimacy is derived from popular, explicit or implicit consent of the governed (quoted in Hoff 2015). Lipset (1959) has argued that legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society. As Thomassen and Van Ham (2017, 3) have said,

> legitimacy is important for democracy because it ensures compliance with rules by citizens, facilitating the solution of collective action problems and enhancing the stability of the political system. If citizens consider political authority as legitimate, they will accept and abide by laws even if such laws do not benefit their individual interests, because they were passed according to legitimate procedures.

Thus, a political system is considered legitimate if its political authority rests on the consent of its citizens. Such a system does not need to be democratic; it can be a monarchy or an autocracy. The commonality between them is what Easton (1975, 444) referred to as "diffuse regime support," which he defined as a "reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate [regime] outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants." This citizen-endorsed right of the political authority to rule is responsible for the "puzzle of authoritarian legitimacy" (Nathan 2020), where the majority of citizens in non-democratic regimes such as China and Vietnam continue to express higher levels of trust in non-democratic political systems. Here, we see two elements of legitimacy that complement each other. One is popular legitimacy, which entails stable and high levels of support for a country's political system from its citizens. The other is elite legitimacy, which refers to the belief by elites in the capacity of the political system to meet or satisfy their aspirations.

Broadly speaking, the literature has identified two sources of legitimacy. The first is internal while the second is external (Coggins 2014). There remains a raging debate on the efficacy of the two sources in state legitimation, especially in relation to the study of African politics. One school of thought suggests that postcolonial African states were granted external legitimacy following ascension to sovereignty at independence due to the world state system. Those writing from this perspective argue that from the outset, African states were deprived of internal legitimacy, since independence was not an outcome of the consent of its citizens (Henderson 2015). This situation led to what Jackson and Rosberg (1984) have referred to as "juridical statehood," where sovereignty

is a function of international law and the international state system. In juridical statehood, the state may not have control over the entire territory it purports to govern yet it is afforded external legitimacy. On the other hand, internal legitimacy refers to *de facto* or empirical legitimacy – that is to say, legitimacy that is derived from popular consent of the governed (Jackson and Rosberg 1984).

Sources of the legitimacy of democracy in Zambia

The attainment of independence in 1964 raised the legitimacy of the Zambian political system and that of the political elite who assumed power at that time. The political system was presumed to be legitimate because it was a product of a national struggle for political freedom to which many Zambian citizens subscribed. Most felt that independence brought to power a government they controlled and that they would collectively use that power to eliminate the negative impacts of colonial rule. But that optimism was short-lived, as the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) swiftly eliminated political competition and suppressed political and civil rights. By 1968, the legitimacy of the Zambian political system showed signs of decline. Scarritt (1979, 13–14) attributes this to several factors, among them weakened support for political competition, increased willingness to curtail political freedoms, and a deteriorating economic situation.

To be sure, the introduction of the one-party state in 1972 delegitimised the gains of political independence. Several studies have shown that the vast majority of Zambians considered the one-party state illegitimate (Molteno and Tordoff 1974; Scarritt 1979). The sources of state illegitimacy stemmed from the denial of political rights to the majority of Zambians who did not belong to UNIP, suppression of freedoms such as free speech and public assembly, and the systematic exclusion of political competitors by UNIP's monopoly of power. Unlike in many other authoritarian African states, political repression in Zambia was enshrined in the constitution. Further, the institutions of the state, including the police, parliament and the courts, enforced the one-party exclusionary constitution and its public policies (Gertzel, Baylies, and Szeftel 1984). Essentially, the law and the state were both used as instruments of the one-party state to implement an agenda whose aim was to restrict political participation of citizens and to exclude political competitors.

Legitimacy during the first and second republics was mediated through a variety of institutions. These included the holding of periodic elections, the promotion of the ideal of national unity, nationalism, and fear of external aggression. Zambians' support for the political system did not change much, even after the introduction of the one-party state, as its legitimacy was also based on the delivery of services. UNIP provided a plethora of good state services until the debt crisis and implementation of structural adjustment policies in the 1980s forced a contraction of the state. While I acknowledge some of the sources of legitimacy identified by Scarritt (1979) in one of the very early studies on sources of democratic legitimacy, I focus on the sources of democratic legitimacy of the Zambian political system since the advent of the multiparty system in 1991. My analysis is informed by several studies and survey data that have emerged in the last two decades.

Following Bratton and Mattes (2001), I demonstrate that support for democracy is more intrinsic than instrumental in that Zambians have supported aspects of the

democratic project over the last thirty years, despite some setbacks, and rendered it viable. It does have its challenges. For example, election results have been disputed on three occasions (1996, 2001 and 2016). Nonetheless the democratic system has thrived, with three alternations of power (1991, 2011 and 2021) and three leadership changes (2001, 2008, and 2015). While most scholars have focused on the decline of legitimacy at different periods of the Third Republic (1991 to date), the argument of this article is that Zambia's multiparty democratic system has endured because it has been given legitimacy by both ordinary people and the political and civic elites who see it as the foundational base for political competition. By this, I mean that while recognising its imperfections, Zambians have generally rendered support to democratic institutions and, unlike elsewhere in Africa, have not resorted to undemocratic and illegal means to challenge, delegitimise or overthrow the state. Moreover, surveys by Afrobarometer consistently show widely shared support for democracy among the Zambian public, rising from 70% in 2003 to 83% in 2020.[2] Below, I discuss five broad factors that explain the enduring legitimacy of Zambia's multiparty democratic system since 1991.

Elections with consequences

The first source of legitimation of the Zambian multiparty democratic system is the holding of regular elections and alternation of political power between political parties. Since independence, Zambia has held general elections every five years, apart from the 2008 and 2015 polls.[3] Like citizens of other African countries, many Zambians understand democracy to refer to the holding of regular elections as an effective mechanism for holding political leaders accountable to the electorate. This point was originally made by Scarritt (1979) and reiterated by Bratton and Mattes (2001) using focus group and survey data. This rather procedural understanding of democracy, which includes holding regular elections, limiting the power of the state by guaranteeing civil liberties and enabling people to have a voice in how they are governed, is partly informed by the colonial experience which denied Africans the franchise and the eighteen years of one-party rule that restricted electoral participation to members of the ruling UNIP. It should be acknowledged, however, that elections under the one-party system were usually competitive, with incumbent ministers losing their parliamentary seats (Sishuwa 2022). Since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, many commentors have generally described elections in Africa as inadequate and of poor quality in terms of promoting democratic consolidation (Bleck and van de Walle 2019). In reference to Zambia, the role of elections in the legitimation of democracy has been considered minimal. For instance, the 1996, 2001, and 2016 elections were generally seen as falling short of democratic standards, with Goldring and Wahman (2016, 120) characterising the latter as a "step backwards for the state of democracy."

Despite significant deficiencies, such as an uneven playing field for opposition players, vote buying, political violence and limited access to the public media, Zambian elections have been remarkably consequential in guaranteeing alternation in power and, in some cases, getting unpopular leaders removed. For example, in the founding multiparty election held in 1991, President Kaunda and his ruling UNIP were swept out of power by a newly formed opposition party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by Chiluba. Twenty years later, in 2011, the MMD was itself defeated at the polls by the

opposition Patriotic Front (PF) led by Michael Sata, who had unsuccessfully contested the 2001, 2006 and 2008 presidential elections. More recently, in August 2021, Hakainde Hichilema of the opposition UPND defeated President Edgar Lungu of the PF with a landslide victory of 59% against 38%.[4] In all three alternations of power, incumbents accepted defeat and peacefully handed over the reins. These alternations in power from one political party to another have assumed a certain regularity that is rare on the continent. However, it is this holding of consequential elections that results in alternation of power which increases public trust in elections as an important mechanism for removing unpopular leaders or holding them to account. Musa Mwenye, a leading member of Zambia's civil society movement and former president of the Law Association of Zambia in the 2000s, emphasised this point:

> One of the most important sources of legitimacy for Zambia's democracy is our shared history of having experienced one-party rule. Under the one-party state, we could not change leaders and our human rights were violated. These difficulties that we experienced between 1973 and 1991 serve as the key source of the legitimacy of an alternative political system that protects civic rights and guarantees periodic leadership renewal as opposed to the one in which one person could stay in power forever. The regular removal of unpopular political leaders through the ballot has strengthened public trust in the democratic system. It has also increased our opposition to any other system that does not give us this opportunity to change governments when we want.[5]

The experience of one-party rule and the ability to change leadership through the ballot were also cited by another prominent civic leader, John Sangwa, as key sources of the legitimacy of democracy in Zambia:

> Elections are what gives our democracy its legitimacy. In fact, when the survival of our democratic system has come under threat, people have used elections to serve the system and prevent a return to dictatorship or the one-party state. They break their ranks, abandon their affiliation and rally behind one candidate to remove the person who has been seen as disruptive to the democratic system. It is more like a country trying to preserve itself. Take away elections from our democracy, we have nothing left. In between elections, all governments tend to do whatever they want, with little to no checks and balances. The only effective safeguard we have is the ballot.[6]

The other pertinent factor is that even elections that did not result in leadership change were closely contested. Alongside the three peaceful transfers of power, there were elections where the opposition came very close to unseating the ruling party. The earliest example occurred in 2001 when Anderson Mazoka of the opposition UPND won 27% of the vote, 2% less than the tally of the winning candidate, the governing MMD's Levy Mwanawasa (Beardsworth 2020). The next notable example took place in 2008 when, following Mwanawasa's death in office, the ruling party candidate Rupiah Banda won the presidential by-election after securing 40% of the total vote, just ahead of Sata with 38%. Other examples included the 2015 and 2016 elections when opposition candidate Hichilema lost by narrow margins. All of this acted to reinforce the possibility of political change through competitive elections and renew elite faith in the democratic system, as the losing candidates felt encouraged to look forward to the next election (Sishuwa 2024b). This reinforced the legitimacy of democracy as an idea and a political system.

Moreover, peaceful democratic change has not been restricted to the presidential level. Since the advent of multiparty democracy in 1991, even in cases where the ruling

party was returned to power, parliamentary elections in several instances have produced strong opposition representation in parliament, as was the case in 2001, 2006, and 2016. Several prominent figures, including a sitting vice-president in 2006 and several ministers in 2021, tumbled in these polls as a result of voters' clear understanding of how to hold their political leaders to account. Other than alternation in power which results from elections, the holding of regular elections also shows the extent of popularity of a government. For example, MMD's popular electoral support declined from 75% in 1991 to less than 30% in 2001. By 2011 the party's support had diminished so considerably that it was easily defeated by the PF in the general election. Thus, to the extent that elections can lead to alternation in power and act as a mechanism for holding political leaders to account, they also serve as an important source of legitimation of the democratic system.

Attached to this point on elections with consequences is the continued reluctance of Zambia's military to interfere in political processes, which narrows the options available to any incumbent president unwilling to concede defeat when it is clear that they have lost. Zambia is relatively unusual in southern Africa in that it experienced a peaceful transfer of power at the end of colonial rule. Armed struggle played no role in the liberation of the country, in contrast to Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This gave the military a circumscribed role in public life and meant that political figures did not ascend to power or keep it on the basis of support in the military (Scarritt 1979). Zambia's first experience of democracy was relatively short-lived. Following independence in 1964 and the competitive elections in 1968, President Kaunda began to view new opposition parties as a threat to UNIP and declared a one-party state in December 1972. But even in this case the government did not rely on the army to impose and maintain this form of political dominance. Negotiations among the country's political elite proved to be key. During the eighteen-year lifespan of the one-party state, the government, to an extent, sought to incorporate the military into political life by establishing party branches in army barracks (Scarritt 1979). As a consequence, the army's independent existence became restricted.

Nevertheless, there were strong indications of opposition to the one-party state and rising demands for the replacement of the government. Wildcat strikes and protests from the mid-1980s, when the economy started a downward spiral, were a notable example. This was followed by attempted coups in 1980, 1988 and 1990, with the military coming closest to assuming political power in Zambia (Powell, Chacha, and Smith 2019). But the coups were unsuccessful and occurred in the context of growing demands for a return to multiparty democracy. It was the latter movement that led to the defeat of Kaunda and UNIP in the historic 1991 election. Despite fears that he might attempt to hang on to power, Kaunda conceded defeat and transferred power to Chiluba, beginning a trend that has since been reinforced on the two subsequent occasions already mentioned. Wider acceptance of democracy limits the actions of the military. A subsequent coup attempt in October 1997 attracted no support from opposition parties or civil society. There has been no attempted military seizure of power since then, though both presidents Banda and Lungu tried unsuccessfully to get the military to intervene in their favour after losing the 2011 and 2021 elections (Sishuwa 2022).

The military's role is limited by the deepening popular belief in democracy as a way of achieving political change, as borne out in reality over the last thirty years by regular

transfers of power and several other elections that can broadly be characterised as fair. This experience limits the possibility for military action, as rank-and-file soldiers also largely support democracy and, as argued elsewhere, would not support military intervention in politics even in cases where the army leadership showed sympathy towards a defeated incumbent president (Sishuwa 2022). While rarely cited in the literature, this is one of the important reasons behind the resilience and enduring legitimacy of Zambia's multiparty democracy. The military is an important institution in any democracy, and their relationship with civilian political leaders can make or break a democratic system. In an era of heightened military interventions in the political process, especially in some parts of West Africa, Zambia's military continues to buck the trend, serving as a positive force in the process of democratisation.

The presence and strength of political parties

The second factor that explains the enduring legitimacy of democracy in Zambia is the unrestricted presence of political parties able to mobilise support, participate in elections, and sometimes wrest power from the party in government. The role of political parties in democratisation in Africa has preoccupied academic attention in the last three decades (Cheeseman 2018). Multiparty democracy cannot be conceived without political parties, but it is important to note that the mere existence of political parties does not make a system democratic *per se*. Other conditions are necessary, such as the strength of political organisations, and their capacity to mobilise and recruit membership, participate in elections and play their role in holding the government to account. Studies on political parties in African democracies that have appeared during the three decades paint a depressing picture (Krönke, Lockwood, and Mattes 2022; Lockwood, Krönke, and Mattes 2022). African parties, other than those in government, tend to be weak, poorly institutionalised, lack a viable source of funding and are highly dependent on personalities. Others have suggested that African parties lack clear and distinct ideological or policy platforms making them reliant on strong personalities and regional bases of support (Beardsworth 2020). Despite these limitations, where there are laws permitting the registration and organisation of political parties and their participation in the political process, such systems are acknowledged as being multiparty regimes.

In the Zambia case, introduction of a multiparty system in 1991 allowed the registration and organisation of numerous political parties that have had a substantial degree of freedom to mobilise supporters, organise campaign events and maintain their existence. Citizens have the right to associate with a party of their choice and generally consider that right to be respected (Simutanyi, Fraser, and Milapo 2015). The parties that have ceased to exist are those that have dissolved themselves. In cases where the government has deregistered parties in the interest of the incumbent president, popular pressure and the courts have resulted in the reversal of these decisions. People believe in these rights and do exercise them. Here, the comparison with Zambia's first experience of democracy is instructive. The emergence of opposition parties after independence was closely followed by their banning, as had been the case in the colonial period. The opposition United Party that split from the ruling UNIP in 1966 was swiftly banned, as was the United Progressive Party established by Zambia's former vice-president Simon Kapwepwe in 1971 (Larmer 2006). Then, with the declaration of the one-

party state in 1972, the only opposition party with significant parliamentary opposition, the African National Congress, was dissolved. Elections continued to take place but with only one party, UNIP, contesting. Following the return to multiparty democracy, the 1991 constitution guaranteed the existence of separate political parties, and this has been respected since then. Although parties have occasionally faced harassment from police and the courts, none have been banned. Coming from a background of single-party monopoly for close to two decades, the large number of political parties founded since the early 1990s has given legitimacy to Zambia's multiparty political system in several ways.

To start with, the presence of numerous political parties has provided a healthy degree of political competition among political elites and given citizens a wider set of options from which to choose who governs them. The extent to which the electoral system is competitive at a given time is a function of other factors such as political relevance, the nature of leadership and the attractiveness of policy platforms. What is incontestable is that since 1991, there has been an unhindered political space for the formation of political parties in the country. The viability of these parties has varied, with few surviving more than two electoral cycles. In fact, from 2015, Zambia became a two-party system although more than forty political parties remained formally registered (Beardsworth and Mutuna 2022). Before the mid-2010s, however, the country moved from a dominant party system in the 1990s to a "competitive party system" in the 2000s. In other words, the party system became more consolidated, as the existence of several political parties offered the electorate a diverse set of alternatives to choose from.

Second, the opportunity for political figures to form their own parties if they fell out with or were expelled from the governing party has been an important expression of democratic dissent that has sustained the legitimacy of Zambia's democratic system. Elites believe they can join or leave any of the major parties and go on to win power or secure upward social mobility. As Neo Simutanyi, one of Zambia's leading political scientists, has argued, the country's political parties have, since the advent of democratisation, largely served as "vehicles for the promotion of personal ambitions of leading members of the elite who change party affiliation to position themselves."[7] The 1991–2021 period in Zambian politics was marked by the circulation of elites. Numerous political figures have left their parties to join others or formed their own to position themselves for power. For example, in the 1990s and early 2000s, several MMD leaders either left or were expelled from the ruling party and went on to form their own parties. This allows political elites to build bases of support and eventually win power (Sishuwa 2024b).

This ability by political elites to move across parties has not only led to the fulfilment of their personal ambitions; it has also contributed to the growth of the Zambian party system, notwithstanding their weak institutional foundations. The PF and UPND are cases in point. Formed by Michael Sata in 2001 after the frustration of his presidential ambitions in the ruling MMD, the PF was initially dismissed as inconsequential after it only won one seat in parliament in that year's election. Five years later, it emerged as a serious contender for power with an established support base. Key here was Sata's ability to turn the PF into a viable electoral machine through an ethnic-regional strategy that targeted his Bemba-speaking regions of Luapula and Northern provinces with messages of marginalisation and a populist campaign in the urban centres of Lusaka and Copperbelt built around issues of unemployment, housing and wages (Cheeseman and

Hinfelaar 2010; Larmer and Fraser 2007). In the 2006 election, Sata came second with 29%, up from 3% in 2001. In the subsequent presidential by-election in 2008, he came within two percentage points of Banda. In 2011 he turned the tide, obtaining 42% of the presidential vote to Banda's 37% (Sishuwa 2022).

The UPND, formed only in 1998, won five by-elections before the 2001 general elections. In the 2001 elections, it was the second largest party with forty-nine parliamentary seats, with Mazoka losing to Mwanawasa of the MMD by less than 2%. The party established at least three regional bases of support – parts of Central, Southern, and North-Western and Western provinces. However, following leadership and succession wrangles that arose after Mazoka's death in early 2006, the UPND lost its North-Western and Western regional bases of support, which either defected to the MMD or supported Hichilema's rival, former UPND vice president Sakwiba Sikota, who split to form his United Liberal Party (Beardsworth 2020; Sishuwa 2023). The UPND struggled to win back the regional bases of support in 2008 and 2011, coming a distant third on both occasions. It was not until 2015 and 2016 that the UPND was able to rebuild its support base, thanks in part to the disintegration of the MMD. By 2021, the UPND had successfully shed its regional party tag and projected itself as having a national appeal, enabling Hichilema to win power (Sishuwa 2022). The point here is that the opportunity to leave one's party and either form or join another has strengthened both elite and mass confidence in the legitimacy of the democratic system since it does not tie them to only remaining with or supporting the party in power. As one former Member of Parliament (MP) observed, elite legitimacy for democracy is also enhanced in the process:

> I would not have been an MP in 2006 if Mr Sata did not leave the MMD to form his own party … . The legitimacy of the democratic system here lies in its ability to meet my aspirations as a citizen to stand for elective office. If it can secure my aspirations, it is in my interest to help preserve and protect such a political system as opposed to a one-party state where my adoption is not guaranteed … [since] everyone will be competing for adoption on the same party. If you remember, in 2006, over forty of us were elected to parliament, many for the first time. It is only appropriate that we support the political system which, through the presidential ambition of one man, made it possible for us to also express our own ambitions at a parliamentary level through his platform.[8]

As well as serving as vehicles for change, parties have also been formed on the basis of elite inclusion. For instance, several smaller parties that allied with the UPND in the run-up to the 2021 elections were led by political figures from different ethnic groups who had little popular base. These individuals and their organisations brought few votes, but their backing allowed Hichilema to present himself as a national figure (Sishuwa and Cheeseman 2021). This is important as it reinforces the idea that political parties are the way to participate in politics and that elite bargaining takes place within the context of elections. Parties with limited electoral support can gain ministerial positions for their leaders when they align themselves with larger parties.[9] This way, the democratic system serves both the ambitions of those seeking to become presidents and others wanting to be ministers – consequently securing its legitimacy in the eyes of these ambitious elites and their supporters.

Lastly, the presence of political parties guarantees voters the possibility, if not inevitability, of alternation of power between political parties. A multiparty system is established on the presumption that political parties will compete for the opportunity to

govern. This opportunity can only be guaranteed if political parties are available to challenge the incumbent party at the polls. Despite a scepticism about political parties' lack of capacity to organise and win power in conditions of uneven playing field, the experience of the last three decades has shown that power can be won even in the face of violence, intimidation and obstruction from the ruling elites (Sishuwa 2022). For example, in 2011 and 2021 when the PF defeated the MMD and the UPND emerged victorious over the PF, the political environment was not favourable to the opposition. Yet the opposition defeated incumbent parties on both occasions. It is this assurance that political parties are vehicles for the realisation of popular expectations, to hold political leaders to account and to install new leaders when the others are judged to have performed poorly, that makes them legitimise a democratic system. In other words, political parties are viewed as important mechanisms for people to govern through their preferred leaders.

Robust civil society

The third source of legitimation of the Zambian multiparty democratic system since the early 1990s is the existence of a robust civil society capable of checking the power of the government and forcing presidents to compromise. The term "civil society" is used here to mean voluntary associations that inhabit "the private sphere of material, cultural and political activities resisting the incursions of the state" (Fatton 1995, 67). Much of the literature on African politics, especially after the third wave of democratisation, assigns significant weight to the role played by civil society in agitating for political change and opposing authoritarian regimes (Hinfelaar et al. 2023). In many African countries, pro-democracy movements were built on the efforts of civil society to challenge the one-party state and demand multiparty democratic reforms. While the strength of civil society in defending democracy and holding governments to account since the early 1990s is debatable (Bartlett 2000), it is not in dispute that the presence of a vibrant civil society that challenges the state and defends civil and political liberties legitimises a democratic system.

Zambia's civil society has undergone two transformations to emerge as an important mechanism for defending democratic rights and norms. The first of these transitions has been a rural to urban shift. During the colonial period, civil society was predominantly rural, centred around a collection of welfare societies and Christian churches, particularly the Roman Catholic Church (Rotberg 1966). Both institutions played important roles in the nationalist struggle for independence. For instance, the first political party in colonial Zambia was formed in 1948 out of welfare societies while religious structures provided key platforms for the expression of nationalist sentiment and mobilisations in rural areas throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Following the achievement of independence, religious organisations and labour unions were among the few that remained outside the control and orbit of the state, including during the one-party era, and mobilised support for the return to multiparty democracy (Hinfelaar 2009). The second transition occurred when civil society, as part of the global reconfiguration of the economic order following the collapse of the Soviet Union, was revitalised in the 1990s with donor, mainly Western, support (Gould 2009). It quickly gained organisational confidence and gradually shifted its focus to constitutional issues.

By the late 1990s, and over the course of the next two decades, civil society asserted its centrality in campaigns to defend emerging democratic norms of Zambia's political system – though it weakened after 2016 (Hinfelaar and Kaaba 2019). This can be illustrated by several important historical moments when the constitution has been a major point of mobilisation for civil society. The first moment occurred in 2001 when the Oasis Forum – an unparalleled alliance of traditional rulers or chiefs, women's groups, churches, trade unions, sections of the intelligentsia and associations of professional bodies – united to protect the two-term presidential limit imposed by Zambia's 1991 constitution (Gould 2009). Chiluba, the first president elected under that constitution, pushed for a third term in office at the end of his two five-year terms. While the role of civil society in stopping this unconstitutional manoeuvre was not decisive, it was necessary and important in galvanising opposition to the third term from Members of Parliament from Chiluba's own party and elements of the military (Sishuwa 2020a). In other words, the presence of a robust civil society willing to give voice to public sentiments and defend the constitution gave legitimacy to the resilience of Zambia's democracy. Mark Chona, the prime organiser of the Oasis Forum, observed that

> In opposing Chiluba's plans to secure a third term of office, we were not just defending the constitution from an incumbent who sought to manipulate constitutional rules; we were also using our shared history of no term limits under the one-party state to sensitise the wider population about the values of democracy in comparison to those of a dictatorship. The public meetings we held in different parts of the country to rally people against the third term were only possible because we live in a democracy, with a constitution that guarantees political and civic rights. So it is in our collective interest to protect the political system that makes it possible for civil society to exist.[10]

The second moment occurred in March 2011 when civil society worked closely with the main opposition party to frustrate the agenda of the MMD government and protect the constitution. Following Chiluba's exit, Mwanawasa immediately embarked on rewriting Zambia's constitution. Civil society organisations made a series of demands, such as the requirement that a winning presidential candidate must secure over 50% of the total votes cast and that the new constitution be adopted through a constituent assembly rather than through parliament (Simutanyi 2012). Mwanawasa died in 2008 before the constitutional reform process was completed. His successor, Banda, took to parliament a Constitutional Amendment Bill that did not contain many of the clauses demanded by civil society. As a result, civic bodies mobilised public opinion against the proposed changes and successfully rallied the main opposition to shoot down the bill in parliament, where it failed to secure the two-thirds majority it needed to pass (Sishuwa 2020b).

The third moment occurred in 2020. This time civil society aligned with the main opposition UPND to defeat the governing PF's own attempt to introduce unpopular changes to the constitution. The proposed Amendment Bill 10 of 2019 included the introduction of a coalition government in the event a presidential candidate failed to garner over 50% of the total votes cast, the re-introduction of deputy ministers, and the removal of the requirements for primary elections in political parties for candidates seeking elective office (Hinfelaar et al. 2022). Civil society organisations campaigned against Bill 10, leading to its defeat in the National Assembly where it failed to garner a two-thirds majority after UPND MPs vetoed the proposals. Earlier, in 2016, in a move that demonstrates its flexibility, civil society did work with both opposition and ruling party

lawmakers to support changes, discussed in detail later, to the constitution that enhanced democracy. Again, this reinforces the notion that the way to achieve political outcomes is through mutually agreed democratic processes.

Since 1991, civil society has also served as a source of livelihood or an exit route out of poverty for educated urban elites outside the party system. The shedding of jobs in the civil service has pushed many educated Zambians, especially university graduates, into the "civil society career" or "voluntary" sectors. Here, with the support of Western donors, these elites have carved out a career of defending constitutional rules and democratic rights and enhancing the credibility of the electoral process through election-linked activities such as voter education campaigns and preventing rigging of results by employing parallel vote tabulation during elections to ensure that any manipulation would be exposed (Beardsworth, Siachiwena, and Sishuwa 2022). As well as contributing to the regular peaceful transfers of power, these efforts have created a mutually reinforcing cycle. As civic bodies build their profile and capacity, the urban elites who staff these organisations are therefore given a tangible stake in the maintenance of democracy. As Brebner Changala, one of Zambia's most experienced civic actors, observed, elections and the constitution have served as key rallying points for non-state actors:

> … Our democracy is legitimate because it gives us two of the most important tools that enable us to conduct our work, that is, the elections and the constitution. Much of our work centres around these two sources. Elections allow us to link our campaign for constitutional reform to the struggle for political change while the constitution gives us the right to associate, to organise, to mobilise, and to challenge presidents seeking to alter constitutional rules to their advantage.[11]

This is an important point that has also been made by Rakner (2021, 96): "[w]hile elections provide the opportunity for contestation over constitutional rules, the historical legacy of pro-democracy movements provides the key mobilizing structure for civil society and the political opposition to organize for the protection of constitutional rights."

Effective independent media

The fourth factor that explains the enduring legitimacy of Zambia's democracy since 1991 is the prevalence of critical independent media outlets – both print and broadcast – that have benefited from and helped build a distinct culture of liberalism. Researchers of African politics have long recognised that democracy requires an independent media that can provide a platform for a diversity of viewpoints and hold the government to account (Okocha and Nwokeji-Udeh 2022). However, the space for free expression and critical commentary on government performance has generally been limited in many African countries, such as Zimbabwe, Uganda and the Gambia, with journalists facing jail terms, persecution and even death. Zambia bucks this trend, although its relatively free and independent media largely emerged only three decades after independence. Under colonial rule, there was virtually no tradition of independent media for Africans, although many African political figures were active correspondents in the colonial press. The brief period for independent media following independence was curtailed when the government bought the country's main newspapers and subsequently established a monopoly on radio and broadcast media (Kasoma 1995). This situation was only altered in the 1990s when, following the liberalisation of the media industry, there

emerged a flourishing independent press – print, broadcast and digital – that focused strongly on politics.

In the period between 1991 and 2016, for instance, *The Post* newspaper, established in July 1991, greatly increased public scrutiny of and debate over the political process. The publication provided a platform for diversity of public opinion, covered all political parties, and exposed government excesses, including violations of democratic rights. It also served as a torch-bearer in highlighting poor government performance and enlightening citizens on the operation of the democratic system. While the newspaper proved a thorn in the flesh of successive governments, it contributed greatly to legitimating the Zambian democratic system. Fred M'membe, who edited the publication for twenty-five years before its closure in 2016, argued that he perceived Zambia's democracy as legitimate because of the existence of critical media outlets like *The Post* and the broadcast media, represented most notably by Radio Phoenix that began operating in 1996.[12] Phoenix's *Let the People Talk*, a weekly broadcast programme that hosted prominent personalities to discuss different national issues, became a household name and one that many urbanites looked to. As other researchers have shown, the two media outlets combined throughout the 1990s and early 2000s to expose state-driven corruption, give voice to civil society on important national topics, and enable Zambians to defend the constitution:

> When Chiluba attempted to seek an unconstitutional third term of office in 2001, it was *The Post* and *Phoenix* that successfully galvanised opposition forces against the move, demonstrating the power and influence of the independent media in post-1991 Zambia. The next MMD administration, led by President Levy Mwanawasa, who succeeded Chiluba in 2001, generally remained committed to the promotion of media freedom, notwithstanding the constant frictions that occasionally arose mainly between the state and *The Post* throughout the early 2000s. Under Mwanawasa, a number of private television and radio stations were opened in Lusaka and even the public media, long disparaged by the public as a mouthpiece for the ruling party, gained some semblance of credibility by giving coverage to the opposition. Opposition forces, and especially Sata's PF, thrived under this political environment. (Hinfelaar, Resnick and Sishuwa (2023, 155)

It is worth acknowledging, however, that governments have, on occasion, attempted to imprison and deport critics (Sishuwa and Money 2023), and in the 2010s the space for critical media diminished sharply with the government's closure of *The Post* over a disputed tax ahead of the 2016 general election (Hinfelaar et al. 2022). Also in 2016, a private television station, Muvi TV, had its licence briefly suspended, while the broadcasting licence of another leading private television station, Prime TV, was withdrawn in the run-up to the 2021 general election. Both stations have since had their licences restored and remain in operation (Hinfelaar et al. 2022). And despite the closure of *The Post*, new newspapers such as *News Diggers* and *The Mast* have swiftly appeared, and their ability to publish is largely unhindered. The role of *Diggers*, for example, was crucial in galvanising opposition forces against the PF's unsuccessful attempts to change Zambia's constitution in 2020 and in exposing corruption, misgovernance and other aspects of the country's political economy.[13] Even the independent broadcast media has grown exponentially since the advent of democracy, thanks in part to the existence of legislation such as the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act that allows for the registration of private radio and television stations. Such has been the phenomenal growth of the private

media landscape that by December 2023, Zambia had 137 radio stations and forty-seven television stations, up from less than a handful in 1991.[14]

Of course, state media remains important, as the government owns two newspapers, and radio and television stations, including the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation. These outlets usually limit coverage of opposition parties and civil society organisations. This context has created a kind of dependence among the independent media, opposition parties and civil society. As Costa Mwansa, the managing director of the country's leading private television station, noted, civic bodies and parties need the private media as a platform to publicise themselves and to initiate debate, "so our interest[s] coalesce around the duty to protect the very democratic system which guarantees us these rights and freedoms in the first place."[15] In turn, and as Larry Moonze who edits *The Mast* newspaper conceded, the free media relies on civil society and opposition parties to generate content and secure their constitutional right to publish.[16] Each needs the other and they have, over the last three decades, acted in each other's defence. Together, these three institutions – and the elites in them – have a strong incentive to defend not just the constitutional rights around freedom of expression and media freedom but also the democratic system itself, effectively giving it legitimacy. This is not to say that Zambia has had no negative incidents of media harassment, but it is to acknowledge that overall media environment in the country cannot be described as "unfree." Callers to interactive radio and television shows are largely free to say whatever they want, and radio and television stations continue to provide platform to citizens to criticise the government (Simutanyi, Fraser, and Milapo 2015, 7).

A liberal constitution

The fifth and final factor that explains the enduring legitimacy of Zambia's democracy is the existence of a liberal constitution that protects civil and political rights, including those of other institutions like political parties, civil society and the independent media. A caveat is important here. The country's 1991 constitution, which provided for multiparty politics, retained many of the authoritarian provisions of the one-party era, which "provide[ed] extraordinary powers and discretion to the executive, even as politics outwardly appear[ed] to be governed by democratic principles" (Hinfelaar et al. 2023, 188). As Ndulo and Beyani (2013) have argued, Zambia's constitution remains deeply problematic even after many rounds of attempted constitutional reform because these efforts have almost always been manipulated by the executive. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the 1991 liberal constitution, with amendments in 1996 and 2016, has served as a key source of legitimacy for Zambia's democracy in three main ways.

To start with, it has explicitly declared Zambia as a multiparty democracy. This declaration is important because it signalled a break from the past. As John Sangwa argued,

> even the one-party state described itself as a democracy but a one-party participatory democracy. Much like the 1964 constitution contained a declaration that Zambia is a Sovereign Republic to show that it was not a protectorate, the declaration in the 1991 constitution showed that the country was moving away from one political system to another. The 1991 constitution was meant to provide for the existence of other political parties. The constitution of 1973 was not consistent with the new values and needed a new constitution to reflect the new values we adopted. The declaration reflected that change and has, since 1991, served as

> a crucial source of mobilisation for civil society and others when defending the values of the democratic system.[17]

Second, the constitution created democratic institutions that gave effect to the declaration and legitimised the new political system by removing any references to "the supremacy of the party" and replacing it with the supremacy of the constitution. Key here was the recognition of institutions like the executive, judiciary and parliament as equals and with no other institution operating above them. In the pre-1991 constitution, the UNIP constitution was part of the national constitution, and these three institutions were subordinate to the ruling party.[18] The elites operating in these institutions or those seeking belonging have, over the succeeding years, found the democratic system to be legitimate because they have a stake in preserving it.

The constitution also legalised opposition parties and paved the way for multiparty electoral competition. This is an important point that was acknowledged by Andyford Banda, leader of the opposition People's Alliance for Change:

> I know that our constitution, just like our democracy, is not perfect, but I consider it to be an important source of legitimacy for our political system. The knowledge that the constitution allows for the existence of multiparty politics empowered me to form a party. I was 34 years old when I started my party. I had the option to join UPND or PF. But I saw that there was no democracy in these two parties. In the US, if you are good enough, you have a chance to be a nominee of one of the two major parties. Not here. The only path for me to get to the top was to form a party. Of course I would not have been able to do this under the one-party state, so I perceive our democratic system as legitimate because it has enabled me to fulfil my aspirations to establish my own political party and participate in the last two general elections where I have finished fourth on both occasions.[19]

It has also provided for the enjoyment of broad civil and political rights that have found expression in the creation of other democratic institutions such as political parties, civil society, and the independent media. As already shown, the elites in these institutions have a stake in preserving the democratic system as it is the source of their activities. As Wynter Kabimba, leader of the opposition Economic Front party, argued,

> I have a stake in protecting the political system because it is also protecting me, and a key source of this relationship is the constitution. In fact, I perceive our democracy as legitimate because of our liberal constitution. … For instance, the constitution provides for the right to public assembly and for political parties to promote and practise internal party democracy through regular, free and fair elections, and to respect the right of its members to participate in the affairs of that political party. It is the respect for these constitutional rights that creates trust in the democratic system, but these rights are products of the liberal constitution. Although we have had challenges, successive governments have generally tried to respect these rights because they are enshrined in the constitution. And this has given legitimacy to our political system.[20]

Thus, after more than three decades of multiparty democracy, the constitution is firmly established as the framework that has provided legitimacy to the political system. This is not to say that there has been strict adherence to constitutionalism or the rule of law since 1991. Rather, it is to acknowledge a general commitment to electoral politics by the country's political elite, founded on respect for the constitution (Simutanyi 2012).

Efforts to change the constitution have usually been met with popular opposition. The exception was the 2016 constitutional amendment, which arguably enhanced

democratic principles and procedures by fixing the election date, taking the power out of the hands of the president, and requiring the winning presidential candidate to secure more than 50% of the total votes cast.[21] In 2001, for instance, Mwanawasa won a crowded presidential election with 29% of the vote against the opposition's combined total of 60%. This change has arguably bolstered the democratic system. In addition, the amendment strengthened the position of political parties from simply recognising that people have the right to form and join political parties to providing for their specific functions and the rights of their members in the multiparty democratic system.

As well as abolishing the position of deputy minister, the 2016 amendment also outlawed floor crossing. Both had been key features of Zambia's political system since 1991 and the executive frequently used them to undermine legislative scrutiny and hence horizontal accountability, and to prevent party and party system institutionalisation. In other words, the informal mechanisms employed by the government to induce MPs to swap sides – which often included promises of key positions and the exchange of large amounts of cash – promoted a form of politics based on the exchange of favours and consequently entrenched forms of clientelism and patrimonialism within the legislature (Sishuwa 2024a). With the removal of a key incentive for patronage politics, the legitimacy of the democracy system has been enhanced.

Furthermore, elite support for democracy through the constitutional order helps explain why the military have been reluctant to intervene in political processes, such as when elections results were legally disputed in 1996, 2001, and 2016. This is because the military itself believes in the sanctity of the constitution as having adequate safeguards to resolve conflicts and disagreements (Sishuwa 2020a).

Conclusion

In much of the work on democratic consolidation in Africa since the 1990s, the general tendency has been to focus on factors that undermine the legitimacy of democratic regimes rather than those that enhance the appeal of such regimes. This article has used Zambia as a case study to provide a much-needed corrective to these studies. It has shown that Zambia has remained a resilient and relatively stable multiparty democracy for over thirty years because there are strong incentives for its political elites to support democracy and to continue to do so as a basis for political participation and competition. The article has shown that the sources of this legitimacy include the holding of regular elections that lead to alternation of power, the presence of a robust civil society that provides voice to public sentiments and holds the government to account, the unrestricted presence of political parties able to challenge the party in power, and an independent media. All four factors are bolstered by a liberal constitution that has helped secure civil and political rights. Altogether, this article has shown that in Zambia, like in many other African countries, "democracy has become a key touchstone for ordinary citizens … [and] is critical into the exercise of legitimate authority" (Cheeseman and Sishuwa 2021, 4). Much research is required to understand why sources of legitimacy identified in the Zambian case may not apply in other countries, such as several in West Africa that have witnessed unconstitutional military coups in recent years.

Notes

1. Interview with Edgar Lungu, Lusaka, 3 April 2023.
2. See Afrobarometer Round 8 Survey in Zambia (Afrobarometer 2020, 26) and Afrobarometer Round 2 Survey in Zambia (Afrobarometer 2003, 31).
3. The 2008 and 2015 elections were presidential by-elections called to fill the vacancies in the presidency after the death of incumbent presidents Levy Mwanawasa and Michael Sata, respectively.
4. Hichilema had unsuccessfully contested the 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, and 2016 presidential elections.
5. Telephone interview with Musa Mwenye, 20 October 2024.
6. Telephone interview with John Sangwa, 7 October 2024.
7. Telephone interview with Neo Simutanyi, 26 January 2024.
8. Telephone interview with Given Lubinda, 18 October 2024.
9. Two of the leaders of the smaller opposition parties that supported Hichilema in the 2021 election were appointed to cabinet.
10. Telephone interview with Mark Chona, 12 September 2024.
11. Telephone interview with Brebner Changala, 23 October 2024.
12. Telephone interview with Fred M'membe, 31 October 2024.
13. Ibid.
14. Independent Broadcasting Authority, "Breakdown by Province for Radio and Television Stations", email correspondence, Lusaka, 17 January 2019.
15. Telephone interview with Costa Mwansa, 17 October 2024.
16. Telephone interview with Larry Moonze, 17 October 2024.
17. Telephone interview with John Sangwa, 7 October 2024.
18. Ibid.
19. Telephone interview with Andyford Banda, 12 October 2024.
20. Telephone interview with Wynter Kabimba, 14 October 2024.
21. Ibid.

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